About 50 minutes into the flight, the airplane passed through 14,000 feet mean sea level (msl) with the autopilot in heading mode and the vertical speed knob set for a 100-knot climb. The pilot and his passenger were using supplemental oxygen. There was a broken cloud layer 1,500 feet below the airplane and he was in visual meteorological conditions, steering west to avoid some weather. He heard a "whirring" sound in his headset and the nose pitched up. He disconnected the autopilot, the left wing dropped, and the airplane appeared to enter a spin. The pilot determined that the airplane would be in the cloud layer below before he could recover and decided to activate the CAPS. The CAPS deployment was successful; the airplane broke out of the clouds about 2,500 feet above ground level (agl), and parachuted into a walnut grove.

The pilot stated to the county sheriff that he did not see any storm activity on his storm scope during the flight. About 1602, the pilot said he was climbing to 15,000 feet to get over (cloud) build-ups. His speech was clear and distinct. About 1607, the pilot made an open transmission that he was out of control, and 3 minutes later, he transmitted that he had deployed the parachute and was descending through 10,000 feet.

At 1221:59, the controller asked: "november eight eight niner juliet bravo, how do you hear, over?"
At 1222:05, the pilot responded: "i'm hearin' ya. i'm hearin' ya. i'm, i'm, i gotta get, ah, my act together here."
At 1222:11, the controller stated: "november niner juliet bravo, fly heading zero niner zero. i have aircraft off your left, will be on the approach at pompano. just fly a ninety heading, climb and maintain two thousand." There was no answer from the pilot.
At 1222:30, the controller stated: "seven eight kilo, turn left, three six zero, it's going to be a short vector, i've got a cirrus disorientated out to the of, ah, east of you. i have to get him under control again." That pilot responded: "three six zero, seven eight kilo."
At 0222:39, the controller stated: "thank you. november seven eight five, turn right, heading one eight zero. this will be vectors across the localizer for aircraft that's just going to be coming across pompano at two thousand feet." There was no response from that pilot.
At 1222:52, the controller asked: "cirrus eight eight niner juliet bravo, miami, how do you hear?"
At 1222:55, the pilot responded: "i hear you, but i've got, i've got problems, i've got avionics problems."
At 1223:02, the controller stated: "cirrus niner juliet bravo, roger. do you have a gyro?"
At 1223:07, the pilot responded: "i'm trying to get the plane, ah, level, nine juliet bravo."
At 1223:11, the controller asked: "okay, november niner juliet bravo, do you see the ground?"
At 1223:16, the pilot responded: "negative, I do not see the ground, nine juliet bravo."
At 1223:21, the controller asked: "all right, you have your wings level?"
At 1223:23, the pilot responded: "the wings are level, nine juliet bravo."
At 1223:24, the controller asked: "november niner juliet bravo, roger, do you have a directional gyro?"
At 1223:28, the pilot stated: "i'm losin', i'm losin' it again here." There were no further transmissions from the pilot.

A second witness, who was outside his home near the accident site, stated that he heard an airplane above the clouds that sounded like it was conducting acrobatics, climbing and descending. Suddenly, it descended out of the clouds, then banked and headed back up into the clouds in a northeasterly direction. As it ascended, the witness heard "an rpm change, like it was climbing." The witness then heard the engine get louder, followed by the sound of an explosion. The witness did not see the airplane exit the clouds a second time due to trees in his line of sight. Another witness, who did see the airplane descend from the clouds the second time, stated that when it did so, the airplane was perpendicular to the ground, "but on a slant."

On December 30, 2004, the pilot logged a flight in which he flew two ILS, one VOR, and one GPS approach. According to the flight instructor on that flight, one of the approaches was flown partial panel, without the PFD. The flight instructor also noted that it wasn't the first time they had practiced partial panel; they had done it a number of times previously.

Palm Beach Approach Control tried to contact the airplane, but received no response. At that time, the airplane appeared on radar to be in a turn. At 1559, radio contact with the airplane was established and a female voice advised that they were having trouble with their instruments. At that time, its encoded altitude was 2,400 feet msl (above mean sea level). At 1600, the female voice requested, and the controller cleared the flight, to return to the airport. There was no acknowledgement.

I contacted Minneapolis center and reported a 3700 ft altitude and climbing, they replied to report back at 7000 or 9000 ft, I don't remember. I then noticed that the autopilot had me in a left hand standard rate turn, even though I was heading east at the time the autopilot was engaged, my next distraction. I then took over the controls to try to get up to the required altitude. In doing so I obviously misread the vertical speed indicator and eventually got the plane into a stall, then into a spin that I could not recover from.

The witness reported that he observed the airplane over the approach end of the runway at an altitude of 150 - 175 feet above ground level (agl). He reported that the airplane was "diving for the runway" and was flying on the left side of the runway over the grass between the taxiway and the runway. The airplane continued to "dive" until it was about one half way down the runway when the nose of the airplane leveled out at an altitude of about 75 feet agl. He heard the engine noise increase, but not to full power. He reported that the airplane "banked hard to the left" and that he could see the top of both wings. He lost sight of the airplane behind a line of trees, and later heard a "thud" followed by another thud.

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with single-engine land and instrument ratings. He held a third-class medical certificate with the following restriction: "Must wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision." The pilot had a total of 2,746 flight hours. The pilot had received 9.5 hours of initial flight training in the Cirrus SR-22 in April 2004, through the Cirrus Design flight-training program in Duluth, Minnesota. He had a total of 167 hours in the SR-22.

The pilot descended into a left hand pattern for runway 26 at best glide speed and was at approximately 1,000 feet above ground level (AGL) "abeam the runway numbers." The CFI reported that the airplane was "stabilized at best glide airspeed on base" when the audible 500 feet AGL warning from the terrain awareness warning system sounded. The CFI stated that the pilot banked "steeply" to the left and when the airplane exceeded 30 degrees of bank he verbally warned the pilot. The pilot "banked [the airplane] steeper," the stall horn sounded, and the left wing "dropped." The CFI then "grabbed the controls to prevent [the airplane] from entering a spin" and applied full power. The CFI reported that the airplane was "losing altitude in the stall with the left and right wing alternately dropping." The airplane subsequently impacted terrain, coming to rest upright and facing "back in the direction from which [the airplane] had come."

At 1329, the airplane leveled off at 13,500 feet. At 1332 the airplane again started to climb to an altitude of about 14,500 feet and leveled off at 1334. The airplane remained at 14,500 until 1338 when it started to climb at a constant rate of about 500 feet per minute. The airplane continued climbing at this rate until 1340 when the airplane leveled off at about 15,400 feet. During the climb the indicated airspeed again started to decrease from 130 knots to about 83 knots at level off. The airplane remained at this altitude but continued to lose airspeed. About 1341 at an indicated airspeed of about 72 knots the airplane pitched down and started into a steep dive. The airplane pitched down to a pitch attitude of about negative 80 degrees. During the dive the airplane rolled to the right about its longitudinal axis through two complete 360 degree revolutions and had started a third revolution, but only attained a +130 degrees of left bank prior to the recovery to straight-and-level flight. The airspeed increased from a low of 72 knots at the start of the dive to a maximum of about 336 knots indicated. Additionally, during the recovery, the airplane sustained a positive "G" loading of 4.733 vertical Gs. (The PFD unit is limited to recording a vertical G-loading of 4.733 Gs even though the actual Gs loading may have been higher). After several positive and negative pitch (+50 degrees nose up to -80 degrees nose down) excursions the airplane ultimately recovered to a straight-and-level flight about 1343. After the initial recovery, the airspeed fluctuated to more than 200 knots after a low of about 120 knots. During the recovery to 2,500 feet, the airplane had lost about 13,000 feet of altitude in about 40 seconds, obtained a maximum airspeed of about 336 knots, and sustained two positive G loadings of at least 4.773 Gs. During the recovery, the recorded data averaged more than 4 Gs for a period of 21 seconds. The airplane never climbed above the recovery altitude of 2,500 feet and landed at MQW about 1401. The entire flight prior to the high-speed dive was smooth and stable. Prior to the upset, the maximum recorded vertical "G" value was about 0.5 Gs centered around neutral. The maximum G value occurred about 1338, when the airplane was at an altitude of 14,500 feet at an airspeed of about 130 knots indicated.

On Sunday, August 27th, the accident pilot and the CSIP pilot flew N91MB for 1.7 hours on an instrument proficiency check flight. Instrument meteorological conditions were encountered during the flight and the accident pilot practiced instrument procedures and flew 2 instrument approaches. The CSIP pilot reported that the accident pilot was on the "top of his game" and that he flew a very good check ride.

On Monday morning, August 28th, the pilot and the three passengers met at the pilot's hangar prior to the flight. The pilot's 29-year-old son, who was not a pilot, assisted loading the cargo on board the airplane. The pilot's son sat in the right front seat, the pilot's wife sat in the right rear seat, and a friend of the family sat in the left rear seat. The pilot's son reported that the takeoff and initial climb were uneventful until the airplane reached about 4,000 feet of altitude. That was when he noticed that the sound of the engine had changed and saw that the pilot was struggling to control the airplane. The airplane went through a series of three quick rolls and the wing dipped down. The pilot was still attempting to control the airplane when he made an emergency call over the radio but there was no response. The pilot's son reported that the airplane entered a counterclockwise spin. The pilot told him to pull the parachute so he pulled the throttle back to idle and then pulled the parachute handle. An officer of the Indianapolis International Airport Police Department interviewed the pilot's son. The officer's report stated that the pilot's son observed the pilot "pulling backwards on the control yoke of the aircraft trying to keep the aircraft's nose up." The report stated that the pilot's son "grabbed the right sided yoke and attempted to help his father keep the aircraft nose elevated." The family friend who was sitting in the left rear seat reported "everything seemed normal" until "just to the point where we could be leveling off, just to the top of the clouds." She stated, "I remember hearing a different sound. I would call it the engine sounded differently, but something sounding differently. Kind of feeling and hearing something underneath of me." She stated, "The only thing I have to compare it to is when the wheels on a commercial flight are put down or up. And feeling two dips to the side, to the right, and definitely hearing [the pilot] talking to the tower at this time." She later stated, "It was like a rumble to me, you know. That the only thing I had to compare it to was the wheels going up and down, or I don't know, flaps, sometimes, on the wings of bigger planes." She stated that she heard the different noise and felt the rumble maybe 30 seconds before the pilot's son raised his arm to pull the parachute. She did not remember seeing him pull the parachute handle since she lost consciousness or blacked out. Numerous witnesses on the ground reported hearing and seeing the airplane prior to the impact. One witness reported that she "heard the plane's engine stop and start and stop again. Then an explosion and it fell out of the sky with the parachute falling behind but it did not deploy all the way. The airplane fell nose first into the water." Another witness heard a loud "pop" and saw the airplane "falling through the clouds" with the parachute deployed about "3/4 open by the time it hit the water."

The airplane was equipped with an XM weather/radio, a stormscope, Skywatch, EMax (engine monitoring system), CMax (electronic approach plates), flight director, TKS anti-icing system, and E-TAWS (enhanced terrain awareness system). The airplane was also equipped with dual Garmin 430 GPS units, a Garmin GTX 327 transponder, and an S-TEC 55X autopilot. The Hobbs hour meter showed 436.1 hours.

In summary, the last 13 minutes of the recording showed a climb from a pressure altitude of 10,900 feet at an average rate of 500 feet per minute, and the airspeed decreased from 147 knots. About 5 minutes later, the altitude leveled at 12, 900 feet and the airspeed began increasing. Throughout the climb and 1 minute after the level off, multiple changes in roll were displayed, ranging from 45 degrees right to 35 degrees left. Approximately 1 minute after the level off, a 360-degree turn was begun, that included changes in pressure altitude between about 12,000 and 13,300 feet; indicated airspeed between approximately 160 and 62 knots; pitch attitude between approximately 30-degrees nose-up and 25-degrees nose down; and vertical speed between approximately 5,200 positive and 6,300 negative feet per minute. During the last minute of flight, the indicated airspeed decreased to 68 knots and a left roll was indicated, with a rapidly changing magnetic heading. Over this time period, the indicated airspeed stabilized at an average of 118 knots and vertical speed stabilized at an average of negative 6,700 feet per minute. At the last recording, the pressure altitude was 5,074 feet and the vertical speed was negative 7,208 feet per minute. Engine data parameters were also recorded. The data showed that during the majority of the flight, the engine was operating at approximately 2,500 rpm. About 1.5 minutes prior to the end of the recording, the engine rpm varied between 1,910 and 2,690 rpm. During the last 30 seconds of recorded data, the rpm averaged 2,500 rpm.

At 1159 MST, the R7 controller instructed the pilot to climb and maintain 13,000 feet. In addition, the pilot was informed about a possible pilot deviation and was provided a phone number to call after landing. The pilot advised the controller that he had a weather cell coming up in front of him and requested a 10-degree deviation to the right. The controller approved the deviation and said, "Direct to GCN when able." The pilot acknowledged. At 1201:37 MST, the R7 specialist being relieved provided a relief briefing to the relieving R7 controller. Regarding N121LD she said, "…He is deviating right around this build up and going to go direct Grand Canyon when he can. [Sector] 8 has radar and he has a number to call when he's on the ground. Yeah, keep him present heading for this guy so watch your Bryce Canyons…." At 1207:10 MST, according to recorded radar data, a minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) activated on the R7 controller's radar display. The warning began when the aircraft descended towards 12,000 feet, which exceeded the MSAW parameters for that area. For 84 seconds, the aircraft's altitude was varying between 12,000 to 12,700 feet. According to the ZLA ARTCC minimum IFR altitude (MIA) chart, the MIA altitude for the aircraft's position was 9,000 feet MSL. At 1207:22, the pilot of N121LD transmitted his call sign twice. At 1207:36 MST, after the controller acknowledged the pilot's transmission, the pilot said, "We have an emergency. We have ice everywhere. Picking up ice." The controller asked the pilot if he wanted to climb. The pilot said, " No, ma'am, we're out of the clouds right now and uh (unintelligible) in front of us. I'm trying to get out of the clouds." According to the controller, she thought the aircraft was at 12,500 feet, and in her judgment, she believed the flight was "okay" and did not issue a safety alert. At 1207:59 MST, the controller replied, "…just descend at your discretion and just let me know when you can level off." At 1208:37, the pilot responded, "ice everywhere one lima delta one." The controller replied, "…roger just descend to get out of the ice and let me know what altitude you can descend to." At 1208:55 MST, the controller instructed the pilot to maintain 9,000 feet but there were no further communications from the pilot. The last recorded radar return was at 1209:11 and the airplane's altitude was not recorded.

The pilot remembered descending below the clouds on the approach, but could not remember any other events associated with the accident. Witness stated the airplane was observed on approach for runway 28 at Statesville Regional Airport. The airplane came out of the clouds in the vicinity of taxiway D and continued over the runway to taxiway F. An increase in engine power was heard and the airplane started a right turn and entered the clouds. The airplane was heard north of the airport and was observed again on the south side of the runway traveling from southeast to the northwest located just below the clouds, and crossed runway 28. The airplane entered the clouds and came out of the clouds north of Aviation Drive. The witnesses observed the airplane make a sharp bank to the right estimated at a 45-degree angle of bank followed by a 45-degree left bank. The nose of the airplane was observed to pitch down and the airplane collided with trees and the ground.

At 1943:22, the tower controller stated, "join the one eight right localizer heading two zero zero now." As the airplane maneuvered, it descended through an altitude of 2,200 feet. At 1943:29, the controller stated, "november five charlie delta, you have low altitude alert, climb immediately to three thousand." During the following 20 seconds, the airplane climbed from 1,800 feet to 3,800 feet, and maneuvered from a heading of 180 degrees to an approximate heading of 330 degrees. During this time, the airspeed decreased from 183 knots to 90 knots, until the final radar return was observed at 1944, approximately 1/4 mile from the accident site. A witness, whose home was approximately 9 miles from CLT, was familiar with the flight path and aircraft sounds operating into and out of the airport. In a written statement, the witness reported hearing an airplane with a "very high pitch" engine sound, flying in a northeast direction, around 1940. The witness noted that the airplane would have been crossing the arrival path for runways 18R/L, which was different than the other aircraft he observed flying on a southerly heading toward runways 18R/L. The witness stated that the sound seemed to "phase in and out," and sounded as if the airplane was climbing and heading away from the airport. The witness stated that the sound seemed to dissipate, and then he heard the engine "whine" again, as if the airplane was turning right toward the airport. At this point, the witness thought the airplane was headed toward CLT, and approximately 15 to 20 seconds later, the engine again "wound up to a very high pitch" and it sounded as if the airplane "banked sharply, and began to nose dive." The witness heard the airplane impact the ground about 4 seconds later.

The pilot told the NTSB investigator during an interview that he informed the controller that he was instrument-qualified because he was getting concerned. His wife was six months pregnant and he feared they would end up in the water. The pilot stated he was struggling to keep the airplane level; he was in instrument conditions in a black hole with out a visible horizon or ambient light. The pilot further stated, "I became spatially disoriented and pulled the chute." When the pilot was asked if there was anything mechanically wrong with the airplane or the flight instruments, the pilot stated no.

The CFI stated that he saw N482SR on short final and saw the airplane go-around. About eight minutes later he saw the airplane over runway 12 about 40 feet above the ground in level flight heading towards his location. He reported that about four seconds later the airplane rolled left, and impacted terrain in an inverted attitude. The CFI indicated that the airplane impacted terrain left wing down, it cartwheeled, and then the post impact fire and explosion occurred.

According to one witness, the pilot announced his intentions to land over the common traffic advisory frequency. The airplane approached from the south at an altitude of approximately 800 feet, crossed the airport near mid-field, and then entered the traffic pattern for a left downwind to runway 6. When the witness contacted, the pilot by a handheld radio the pilot responded "I'm turning base." Within a few moments, the witness heard the airplane impact the ground.

The Avidyne System installed on the airplane was sent to the National Transportation Safety Board's Vehicle Recorders Division, Washington, D.C. The Multi-Function Display with a global positioning system was downloaded. A chart was created using the data depicting the flight path of the airplane just prior to the accident. The last hit indicated that the airplane altitude was at 838 feet, vertical speed was down -444 feet per minute, indicated airspeed was 60.3 knots with a pitch attitude of up 4.98 degrees and a left roll of -31.73 degrees.

The pilot attributed the accident to a malfunction of the airplane's electric trim. He reported that since purchasing the airplane new in January 2008, he had experienced multiple events where the airplane would pitch upward or downward as much as 3,000 feet per minute (fpm) during flight in turbulent conditions with the autopilot engaged. One week before the accident, the pilot flew the airplane with a Cirrus representative on board and "confirmed that the airplane still had an issue with an inadvertent trim up or down during turbulent flight." According to the pilot, "the bumps of the dirt field caused a similar jarring to the aircraft as turbulent weather resulting in the trim back in the electronic trim system."

The Cirrus representative who flew with the pilot 1 week before the accident reported that during that flight, the pilot engaged the autopilot in the heading mode and selected VS/ALT to climb to a pre-selected altitude at 500 fpm. The representative further reported that "after only a few hundred feet, the autopilot increased the rate of climb to between 1,000 and 2,000 fpm and at peak was climbing at 2,200 fpm. With the autopilot disengaged, the plane flew straight and level with the proper trim inputs." The representative concluded that the autopilot was "malfunctioning in pitch mode." Cirrus personnel had made arrangements to pickup the airplane on September 2, 2008, and have the autopilot repaired.

At 1910:44, the pilot contacted Tallahassee Tower and stated that he was on the ILS runway 27 approach. The controller cleared him to land, and reported the winds being from 170 degrees at 6 knots. At 1912:06, the controller advised the pilot that he was right of course, fly heading 240, and rejoin the localizer. The pilot did not respond initially, but after the controller repeated the instruction, the pilot acknowledged it. At 1912:27, the controller again told the pilot to turn left to a 240-heading, which the pilot acknowledged. At 1912:33, the controller stated, "you're going north ah north-westbound, turn left to two four zero," which the pilot did not acknowledge. At 1913:38, the controller again directed the pilot to turn left to 240, and advised him that he was still right of course, which the pilot acknowledged. At 1913:49, the controller stated "seven golf mike Tallahassee," and the pilot responded, "seven golf mike's gotta go." There were no further transmissions from the pilot.

Several witnesses observed the accident airplane as it was on final approach to runway 23. Three of the witness were certificated pilots, and during separate interviews recounted a similar series of events. The witnesses stated that when they initially observed the airplane's approach, it looked "normal". None of the witnesses observed any flames or smoke emanating from the airplane. The airplane cleared the trees and fence prior to the approach end of the runway, but then "pitched [nose] over and went down." They further described that the airplane's attitude was consistent with one normally approaching to land, but the airplane then unexpectedly pitched down into a near 45-degree dive and impacted terrain. One of the witnesses responded immediately to the accident site and noted no fire, smoke, or abnormal fumes.

At 2142, ATC asked the pilot if he was encountering any icing. The pilot replied, “Five lima victor is not picking up any ice at this point.” ATC advised the pilot that about 30 – 40 miles north of Minneapolis there were reports of moderate icing between 3,000 – 4,000 feet msl. At 2143, the pilot stated, “Okay, we’ll keep our eyes open. Thanks." There were no further radio transmissions from N495LV.

Radar track data indicated that at 2143 the airplane was flying in a north, northwest direction and crossed the Red Cedar River about a half mile south of the accident site. The track data indicated that the airplane entered a right turn. The last radar return at 2144 was approximately one half mile to the northwest of the accident site. There were no altitude indications since the radar was not receiving the transponder’s Mode C reply. The airplane impacted a field and traveled about 100 feet prior to entering a tree filled ravine. 

The nose of the airplane pitched down vertically and the airplane started spinning. Just before the airplane disappeared below the tree line, the witnesses observed an orange or red parachute deploy, but the parachute did not inflate. A short time later they heard the sound of an impact.

Review of data downloaded from the multi-function display (MFD) and primary flight display (PFD)confirmed the pilots departed SFB at 1408. At 1413:30, the maximum-recorded airspeed was 115 knots with a ground speed of 124 knots. The engine rpm was reduced from 2,440 rpm to 1,840 rpm at1413:34. At 1417:10, the airplane was at 3,257 feet, heading 078 degrees. The airplane began to pitch down with an indicated airspeed of 60 knots and a ground speed of 57 knots. At 1417:19, the airplane had descended down to 3,138 feet on a heading of 082 degrees with an indicated airspeed of 75 knots and a ground speed of 63 knots. The engine rpm decreased to 1,050 rpm at 1417:28, and the airplane was heading 081 degrees at 50 knots indicated airspeed and ground speed. At 1417:29, the airplane began a 13-degree left wing down roll before it reversed its direction to the right. The right roll reached 28 degrees before it reversed its direction back to the left. At 1417:34, the airplane was at 3,131 feet heading 064 degrees, the engine rpm had increased to 2,500 rpm, the indicated airspeed was 54 knots, and the ground speed was 52 knots. The airplane entered a left hand spin at 1417:35, and the recorded primary flight display data ends at 1418:02.

A Lieutenant Colonel with the Civil Air Patrol was exiting a building on the south side of the airport when the accident occurred. He reported that he heard the airplane and that the engine was very loud. He then heard the engine power increase as if the pilot was performing a “go-around.”He stated he heard the impact and looked toward runway 14L where he saw the airplane engulfed in flames. The witness stated there was “moderate to heavy” rain at the time of the accident. Another witness, who was on the southeast side of the airport perimeter stated he saw the airplane coming in from the north and watched it as it attempted to land. He reported the airplane turned over on its right side, appeared to stall, and impacted the ground.

After completing a 167-mile cross country flight in dark night conditions, the pilot landed on a5,000-foot long runway. The pilot stated that during the landing roll, the airplane encountered a gust of wind from the right, and he could not prevent the airplane from drifting to the left. He said that he applied full power and attempted a go around, but the airplane would not become airborne. The pilot said he reduced power before the airplane struck a fence on the left side. There was substantial damage to the wing, fuselage, and the landing gear, but no injuries to the four persons on-board.